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Does an increase in the generosity of federalfinancial aidmake collegemore affordable,or does it simply encourage colleges toraise tuition? In a Feb. 19, 1987 New YorkTimes op-ed titled “Our Greedy Colleges,”former federal secretary of education Wil-liam Bennett made a strong case for the
latter when he stated, “If anything, increases in financial aid in
recent years have enabled colleges and universities blithely to
raise their tuitions, confident that federal loan subsidies would
cushion the increase.” This seemingly simple claim has spawned
a long, often heated, and highly politicized debate.
The “Bennett hypothesis” often is justified as simple econom-
ics. Federal aid is a subsidy. Increases in subsidies raise demand,
and rising demand pushes up price. Yet the textbookmodel of a
perfectly competitivemarket is a poor fit for the higher education
industry as a whole, and it’s quite inappropriate for understand-
ing how tuition is determined at the nonprofit institutions that
still dominate the higher education landscape. Colleges and
universities are price setters, not price takers. Yale, Valparaiso, and
Southeastmissouri State all “sell” education, but the services they
offer are quite differentiated. And unlike most firms, nonprofit
colleges anduniversities often turnawaybusiness. They care about
who purchases their services.
We will present a simple enrollment management model of
how nonprofit colleges jointly decide how to fill their classes and
RobeRtb. ARchibAld is chancellor Professor of economics at the college
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Does FeDeral aiD
Drive College
TuiTion?
The “greedy colleges” thesis conflicts with how nonprofit universities
decide on admissions and pricing.
✒ by RobeRt b. ARchibAld And dAvid h. FeldMAn
set tuition. Any vice president for enrollment will recognize this
model as a close representation of how these decisions actually
aremade. This simple theoretical structure often ismissing from
popular discussions of how federal policy affects affordability, and
fromempirical tests of possible links between aid and tuition. The
enrollment management model does not prove kind to the idea
that federal aid causes tuition inflation at nonprofit institutions.
On the other hand, there is good evidence for a Bennett effect at
for-profit schools, whose behavior is better represented by the
textbook model.
Although our theoretical framework finds no incentive for
most colleges to adjust their tuition in response to changes in
federal aid, institutions can “tax” away a part of the federal aid by
reducing their own institutional aid. Schools can redirect those
resources to other institutional uses.However, unless this tax rate
implausibly exceeds 100%, students will still see lower net price
tuition. The best evidence on the tax rate is that it is low overall,
but higher at highly selective private institutions that are very
generous with their own aid.
enRollMent MAnAgeMent
All schools that are even minimally selective must have a way
to produce the best possible incoming class while also hitting
target levels of enrollment and revenue. The following simple
model shows how this is done. In the short run we will assume
the size of the institution is set. Its buildings, faculty, and staff
determine that size. The school also knows how much revenue
it needs in order to maintain its quality, and how much of that
revenue it needs to extract from students in the form of tuition.
The process begins with the pool of applicants. All selective
EDUCATION
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schools have some mechanism to rank potential students. For
example, a schoolmight employ a 10-point scale. Students rated
10 are the highest-quality applicants from the institution’s per-
spective. Amherst’s 10’s and “Compass Point” State’s 10’s aren’t
the same group. Amherst’s 10’s will have rarified test scores and
very impressive high school records. Nonetheless, for Compass
Point State, its 10’s will have the highest test scores and the best
high school transcripts of its applicant pool. In addition,many of
the 10’s will bring something special to the incoming class: they
may be accomplished athletes or musicians, or they may offer
geographic, economic, or racial diversity.
All schools would love to fill the incoming class with 10’s, but
few can come even remotely close to hitting their revenue needs
from that group alone. That brings us to the next step in our
representative school’s admission process: estimating thewilling-
ness to pay of this most select group of applicants.
most schools have information they can use to make this
determination. Some applicants have had siblings or parents
who attended. Some may have applied using “early decision” or
actively pursued the institution in ways that suggest real interest.
many will have filled out financial aid forms that reveal a lot of
information about family income and assets. On the other hand,
the school will also know that these 10’s are very attractive to
other schools. Competing colleges may offer them large scholar-
ships, and this may affect the applicants’ willingness to pay at
the school. As a result, the “yield” from this group may not be
particularly high. The yield is the fraction of any particular group
of admitted students that actually enrolls. This is not as large a
problem for Harvard, Stanford, and Amherst, though even they
must compete for the 10’s in their pool.
Howmuch revenue can the school extract from itsmost highly
sought applicants with a 10 ranking? Figure 1 gives an example.
The school has a target enrollment of E* and knows that to hit
its revenue target the average student who enrolls must bring in
AT* in net tuition. The rectangle of AT* × E* is the total revenue
the school needs to collect. The height of the bars represents the
willingness to pay of the 10’s the school believes actually will
enroll after the dust settles on the admissions game. The diagram
is constructed by placing students from left to right in declining
order of willingness to pay. The shaded area under the bars givesph
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the total willingness to pay from the
portion of the 10’s group the school
reasonably expects to matriculate. If
the institution candesign its financial
aid offers adroitly, it will charge each
student his or her full willingness to
pay. The shaded area is the revenue
the school can get from this group. A
quick look shows that the school can-
not reach its revenue requirement or
its enrollment goal from the group of
students with the highest admission
rating. Given the fact that these 10’s
havemanyother options, there simply
aren’t enough of them with a high
willingness to pay who will choose to
attend the school.
In order to meet revenue and
enrollment goals, almost all selective
programs admit and enroll studentswith lower admission ratings.
Knowing the odds of enrolling students with successively lower
admission ratings, schools can eventually craft a class with the
highest possible average admission rating that satisfies the tuition
revenue requirement while filling the seats in the entering class.
In its enrollment decisions, a school may find that many of its
6’s and 7’s have a higher willingness to pay thanmany ormost of
the 10’s. These lower-ranked applicants have fewer opportunities
to earn merit scholarships at more selective schools, and many
come from high-income families that do not qualify for need-
based aid. For some schools this means that a student from the
6-group with a very high willingness to pay may get preference
over a student from the 8-group with a very low willingness to
pay. These schools practice “need aware” admissions.
Figure 2 illustrates the full outcome of the enrollment man-
agement process after the school has
accepted students as far down the list
as it thinks it needs to go. The area
covered by thewillingness to pay bars
above AT* is exactly equal to the area
below AT* not covered by student
willingness to pay. If each student is
charged exactlywhat the family is will-
ing to pay, the average tuition will be
AT* and the institution will sell all of
its seats. Institutions accomplish this
by setting the list-price tuition at LT,
the height of the highest willingness
to pay bar, and giving the remaining
students tuition discounts. Often
these tuition discounts are given
added marketing cachet with schol-
arship names.
This model is clearly a simplifica-
tion. The real tuition-setting process
is more uncertain and haphazard. For
example, we assumed that the institu-
tion knows each family’s willingness
to pay and we also assumed it could
accurately forecast the yield for each
group of students. Some students do
reveal their willingness to pay by pre-
senting schoolswith competing offers
as part of a bargainingprocess. But for
the most part schools make guesses
aboutwillingness topayusing rules of
thumb or with some type of forecast-
ing model. Also, the yield on offers of
admission canvaryunexpectedly from
year to year, and between the 10’s, 9’s,
8’s, and so on down the list. Nonethe-
less, we think this simple discussion
captures the essence of how tuition is set inmuchof the nonprofit
sector.Themodelpresumes the revenueneedsare setfirst, basedon
the existing size and cost structure of the school, and the tuition
setting and admission decisions are made together afterward.
At many public institutions, the legislature or a state board
sets the list-price tuition. These schools have fewer levers to pull
in crafting the incoming class. But selective public institutions
still follow most of the enrollment management process. Their
discount rates tend to be lower.
For-profit schools / The model is not a good description of how
for-profit schools operate. These schools maximize revenue in
the short run and profits in the long run.
For-profit schools do face some constraints on their selection
of students. To keep their access toTitle IV programs (Pell Grants
and federally backed students loans),
they need to ensure that their three-
year cohort default rates on student
loans remain within federal limits,
and they need to get at least 10 per-
cent of their revenues from non-Title
IV sources (i.e., money from students
and their families). But this sets a
bare minimum quality standard for
students.
For-profit schools do not sculpt
their classes to improve the learning
environment for everyone, and they
have no particular interest in offer-
ing scholarships to attract particularly
talented students to the residential
mix.most applicants to these schools
will pay a set price with little or no
Figure 1
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internal discount. The financial aid that is available to students
at for-profit institutions is almost whollymade up of federal Pell
Grants and loans.
The BenneTT hypoThesis
We cannow ask how anonprofit institution practicing the enroll-
ment management approach we’ve described might change
its behavior when the federal government makes financial aid
more generous. let’s consider an increase in the maximum Pell
Grant. Pell support goes to students with the lowest ability to
pay. Because they are income-constrained, these students also
have the lowest willingness to pay. If the Pell Grant maximum is
raised,many of these lower-income studentswill bewilling to pay
more for a chance at a degree. Figure 3 illustrates this situation.
The lighter-shaded portion of the willingness-to-pay bars shows
the increased willingness to pay of students whose maximum
Pell Grant has grown.
After an increase in the Pell maximum, an institution has
many options and they’re all good. however, some of them are
less good for the average student who relies on Pell Grant sup-
port to pay for school. The best thing the institution could do to
make college more affordable for its Pell recipients is to subtract
the full increase in the Pell Grant from the amount the student
needs to borrow. At the other extreme, the institution could cut
its own institutionally funded scholarships dollar-for-dollar with
the increased federal support. In the first case, the institution has
not taxed the extra federal support at all; every dollar of added
Pell support goes directly to the student in the form of a lower
net price. In the latter case, the institution would get a tuition
windfall; the institutionhas effectively imposed a 100% tax rate on
the addedPellmoney, leaving the average Pell recipient’s net price
unchanged. But notice that in neither case would the student see
a higher list price or net price.
A 100% tax rate is not 100% bad
news for students, dependingonwhat
the collegedoeswith the foundmoney.
That extra revenue could be used to
improve programming that benefits
all students, Pell recipients and full-
paying students alike. Alternatively, it
could be targeted to student support
services that are of disproportionate
benefit to students from a disadvan-
taged background and to students
who are the first in their family to
experience the college world.
The federal government might
prefer the first option, a zero internal
tax rate. But it’s up to the schools to
set the tax rate because they know
the Pell Grant award students are get-
ting before they make their decisions
about financial aid awards. The Pell program is an example of a
“first dollar” award. Schools get to give the last dollar and the giver
of the last dollar has more choice.
The school’s most pressing needs will have a strong effect on
the tax rate it chooses. Passing extra federal support to students
as a lower net price can enlarge the applicant pool and this could
help a university to attract a few more 10’s and 9’s compared to
schools that tax the extra Pellmoney heavily. This would improve
the quality of the incoming class and boost the graduation rate a
few years later. In fact, for students who are near the threshold of
Pell eligibility, the desirability of getting students tagged as Pell
recipientsmay encourage some schools to addmore institutional
aid to those students’ packages to boost the yield in that group,
and there is very good evidence thatmany schools do behave this
way.On the other hand, schools that offer very generous internal
grant aid to low-income familiesmay divert a large fraction of the
extra federal aid into programming to aid students. At some elite
programs, the net price is already zero for low-income families, so
there is little incentive not to tax extra federal aid.
In our enrollment management model, list-price tuition is set
by thewillingness to pay of the wealthiest families whose children
attend the institution. These students won’t be eligible for Pell
Grants.moreover, schools cannot increase a student’s PellGrantby
raising the list-price tuition.Thesizeof thePellGrant isdetermined
by thedifferencebetween thePellmaximumand the expected fam-
ily contribution (eFC). Congress controls the Pell maximum, and
theeFC is a formulabasedon family income, family assets, and the
number of children the family is supporting in college.
high-income families aren’t the ones on the borderline
between getting some Pell support and getting none. And at
most nonprofit institutions, these families are unlikely to be
eligible for subsidized federal loans or tuition tax credits. Accord-
ing to theDigest of Education Statistics, for the 2010–2011 academic
year, 37% of students at private four-
year schools did not borrow and 11%
received no financial aid at all. most
nonprofit colleges have at least a few
students who pay the full list-price
tuition, and these families aren’t
affected by funding increases in need-
based federal programs.
Some states offer their own tuition
assistancegrants to studentsattending
in-state nonprofit institutions (public
and private). These state grants often
are not need-based. making these pro-
grams more generous could induce
tuition increases because they affect
the willingness to pay of high-income
families. These are not the programs
that concerned Bennett.
There are some institutions that
Figure 3
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offer fertile ground for a Bennett effect. The first is the set of rela-
tively non-selective colleges, which pull in no students from the
high-income families that are immune to direct federal (or state)
subsidy policies. An increase in the generosity of federal financial
aidmightaffect thewillingness topayof the studentswith thehigh-
est willingness to pay at these institutions. The second and more
important category is the large set of for-profit schools. For-profit
schools do very little if any tuitiondiscounting. These institutions
donot try to shape the incoming classwith an educational goal in
mindoramission toachieve.Acosmetology schoolora school that
trainsmedical coderswill notoffer tuitiondiscounts toparticularly
able or needy students in the same way that a private nonprofit
institution or a state-supported institutionmight.
These institutions also are heavily dependent on federal funds.
In 2013, the for-profit sector absorbed 20% of the total alloca-
tion of Pell grants and 42% of Post-9/11 GI Bill dollars. In the
2009–2010 academic year, over 75%of the revenue in the for-profit
sector came from federal Title IV sources. In 2014, only 12%of the
1,947 proprietary schools earnedmore thanhalf of their revenues
from non–Title IV sources. Almost 20% of them received more
than 85% of their revenues from Title IV programs. The legal
limit is 90%. In the proprietary sector, the willingness to pay of
almost all of their students will be affected by an increase in the
generosity of federal financial aid.
In his op-ed, Bennett argued that “our greedy colleges” would
tax any increases in the generosity of federal financial aid by rais-
ing the tuition students have topay.Wehave argued at length that
this conclusionhas very limited scope. In the traditional nonprofit
sector, neither list price tuitionnor thenet price that students face
is likely to rise following an increase in the generosity of federal
financial aid. The one exception is in the for-profit sector where
the competitive model seems more appropriate than the enroll-
ment management process in use at mission-driven nonprofits.
Yet Bennett’s broader point may hold. Schools can tax an
increase in federal aid. We simply posit a different mechanism.
In the enrollment management model, taxation is much more
likely to come in the form of reducing eligible students’ tuition
discounts rather than in the form of higher tuition (list or net).
The traditional nonprofit sector can siphon off a portion of the
government aid and repurpose it toward other institutional goals.
Howmuch of this goes on is an empirical question.
eMPiRicAl studies oF the bennett hyPothesis
There is a long and growing body of empirical work on possible
links between federal aid policy and the list price (or net price)
tuition that colleges and universities charge. Instead of offering
another exhaustive review of this increasingly complex econo-
metric work, we will focus on two aspects of it. First, we want to
summarize the main contributions and identify what we see as
some fundamental weaknesses. These weaknesses should cause
analysts and policymakers alike to shy away from overarching or
hard-edged claims about the tuition-raising effect of u.S. policy
toward higher education. The evidence is nuanced, not conclu-
sive. Secondly, recent evidence fromanumber of papers fits nicely
into the enrollmentmanagement frameworkwe outlined earlier.
The enrollmentmanagementmodel offers no firmprediction
about the tax rate an institution might choose, but it does high-
light the role of competition. Schools that are not very selective
have towork harder to enroll a student of a given quality than do
more selective schools. Other things equal, this suggests that less
selective programs are likely to passmore of the subsidy through
to applicants as a lower net price.Other things, however, are rarely
equal. Schools that need extra revenue more than they need the
benefits of higher yield on offers of admission might choose to
tax at a higher rate. On this margin, less selective schools may
be the ones with a stronger need for extra revenue. These two
incentives may push a school in opposite directions in deciding
how to tax an extra dollar of federal aid, which is why we offer no
clear prediction about the tax rate set by these institutions. On
the other hand, well-endowed, highly selective schools that fully
meet all or most financial need with internal grant aid may see
little need to pass additional federal aid through to students.We
would forecast a higher tax rate at these highly selective schools.
Whatdoes the empirical literature actually tell us?First, theover-
all evidence about theBennetthypothesis isn’t remotely conclusive.
In an early work on Pell Grants, michael mcPherson andmorton
Schapiroexamined institution-leveldata fromtheu.S.department
of education’s Integrated Postsecondary education data System.
They found a positive relationship between gross tuition revenue
and federal aid revenue at public universities but not at private
institutions.This suggests that thepublic schools taxed theaidbut
private schools did not. By contrast, an exhaustive congressionally
mandated study conducted by theNational Center for education
Statistics found no relationship between federal/state grant aid or
loans and institution-level tuition increases. In a third study, larry
Singell and Joe Stone looked at the relationship between the total
amountof tuition revenuecollectedatpublic andprivatenonprofit
institutions and the size of the average Pell Grant award per recipi-
ent.They foundnorelationshipatpublicuniversitiesbut apositive
relationship at private schools, suggesting that the private schools
taxed the aid but the public schools did not.
One of the most recent studies in this vein is a 2015 working
paper from researchers at the Federal reserve Bank of New York.
They found that an additional Pell dollar to an institution leads to
a 55¢ rise in sticker price, while an extra unsubsidized loan dollar
has a 30¢ effect. While this paper is not yet final, the loan effects
appear to be statistically robust but the Pell effect is less so. This
study recognizes that tuition and loans/grants are bi-directionally
linked, i.e., easier loan availability could cause tuition to increase
or rising tuition could cause loan demand to rise. But like much
of this literature, this paper lacks a convincing causal story forwhy
tuitionmight be linkedwith federal policy and it omitsmany con-
trols that in theory could have generated the observed correlation.
This very partial review tells us a number of things. First, no
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clear answer has emerged. If you look around, you can find any
result youwant. One reason for this is that there is no consensus
onwhat relationship should be tested.What is the rightmeasure
of federal policy, for instance? Is it the maximum Pell Grant (or
loan) a student can get (as in theNewYorkFed study), the average
level of Pell support per student at affected institutions (Singell
and Stone), or the total amount of federal funding an institution
receives (mcPherson and Schapiro)? different studies use differ-
ent measures and there is no agreement about the appropriate
relationship to test. There is also no common understanding of
the right set of control variables to use. One reason is that all of
this work is at best only lightly related to any structural model
of how colleges and universities actually behave.
Building a causalmodel of university behavior is certainly not
the only path towisdom, but the absence of onemakes interpret-
ing these very contradictory results quite difficult. A positive link
between aid and tuition could be simple spurious correlation,
while the absence of a link might reflect a failure to include an
important control variable that is positively correlated with aid
but negatively correlated with tuition.
Our model of tuition setting suggests a particular way to use
control variables. For instance, you should clearly control for
different types of institution if your structural model tells you
that they behave differently. You should control for-profit schools
separately because their pricing mechanism is quite different
from nonprofits. Within nonprofits, state schools operate quite
differently. You should control for differences in the pattern of
state-level higher education spending per student (their business
cycle), and at what level they set their public university tuition
(at the institution level, by a state board, or by the legislature).
The size and composition of state-level financial aid programs is
another important control that is rarely used.
lastly, the private nonprofit sector is not monolithic. Our
model suggests that schools without a meaningful cadre of
wealthy families will set their list price differently than schools
that have a sizeable contingent of wealthy families. Studies that
do not control for these predictable effects are unlikely to offer
good tests of institutional behavior, and any correlations that
emerge may very well be spurious.
As one example,weknowofno studyof theBennett effect that
has attempted to control for the tuition-settingmechanismat the
state level, or for the interactionof state policymakingwith federal
aid policy. Increases in non-need-based state aid to students can
indeed create a Bennett effect, so any study that does not control
separately for changes in state aid programs may very well find
a spurious link between federal policy and list price tuition at
institutions in that state. likewise, controlling for institution
type often is not done (as in theNew York Fed study cited above),
and the groups of schools that are often aggregatedmay contain
subgroups that behave in opposite ways.
We realize that charges of omitted variable bias are sometimes
the last refuge of an intellectual scoundrel. After all, anyone can
dismiss evidence he dislikes by claiming that the study in ques-
tion has not controlled for every possible
influencing factor. But when the literature
in question has coughed up clearly contra-
dictory findings and many of the papers
have left out seemingly crucial correlates
(sometimes for lack of data), the case for
worrying about omitted variables is quite
strong. Omitted variable problems seem
endemic in this literature.
There are a number of recent studies
that do capture important features of the
simple model of institutional price setting
that we have outlined. The first is a study of the for-profit sector
byStephanieCellini andClaudiaGoldin.Ourmodel suggests that
a Bennett effect is quite plausible in the for-profit sector, and that
is exactly what Cellini and Goldin observe. They identify a set of
for-profit institutions in five states that offer very similar services
to very similar students. The major difference is that some of
the schools are eligible to participate in Title IV programs. Their
students are eligible to receive federal grant and loans. Other for-
profit schools in the study are not Title IV–eligible because they
lack accreditation. Cellini and Goldin find that the Title IV–eli-
gible schools charge a higher tuition than the schools not eligible
for Title IV programs across all states, samples, and specifications,
controlling for program length, enrollment, how long the school
has operated, and a set of other school, location, and year effects.
The tuition premium is 78%. They also show that tuition at Title
IV schools for particular programs that are too short to qualify
for federal aid is about the same as what is charged for similar
programs at non–Title IV schools. This suggests that school qual-
ity differences are not driving the result.
In a recent working paper, Christopher lau confirms this
finding about for-profit institutions, whose students use a sur-
prisingly large fraction of federal aid. In the 2008–2009 academic
year, students at for-profit schools comprisedonly 11%of the total
postsecondary population, but they received 24% of Pell alloca-
tions, 28% of unsubsidized Stafford loans, and a quarter of the
subsidized Stafford loans. lau estimates a differentiated product
model of monopolistic competition in the for-profit sector and
When the literature in question has coughed up clearly
contradictory findings and many of the papers have left
out seemingly crucial correlates, the case for worrying
about omitted variables is quite strong.
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shows that for-profit schools absorbed 57%percent of Pell grants
and 51% of extra loan amounts, passing through the remainder
to students as consumer surplus (a lower net price).
lesley Turner directly addresses the tax rate question that we
pose by estimating the economic incidence of the Pell program,
taking into consideration how schools can adjust their own aid
packages for individual students. She exploits two features of the
aid systemto separately identify the effects of federal aidprograms.
The Pell program has discontinuities in both the level of aid and
the slope (rate of change) that lead similar students to get differ-
ent amounts of support. Overall, she finds the tax rate is amodest
12–16%. Things are more interesting when she breaks the higher
education industry down into specific subsectors. Selective non-
profits tax at amuchhigher rate (79%). This could be a functionof
theirmarketpower, thoughaswehavenoted it couldalsobecaused
by the fact that these schools already offer a very low net price to
low-incomestudents. Publicuniversities’ net tax rate is close tozero.
In fact, public universities exhibit awillingness to pay for students
categorized as Pell recipients, though some of the increased aid
that they give to students who are near the Pell threshold comes
from Pell recipients who are even more needy. She also finds that
the for-profit schools tax rate is a low 18%, which is similar to the
amount appropriated bymost non-selective schools.
The fact that for-profit schools assess a modest tax rate is
perfectly consistent with the finding that they raise their list
price in response to federal subsidization. A strongBennett effect
coupled with a low tax rate may seem odd at first, but this sector
does not use institutional aid to craft the group of students who
enroll, unlike their more selective nonprofit brethren, so there is
little institutional aid to displace. That does not mean that aid
is passed through to students. As lau and Cellini and Goldin
have shown, the for-profit sector takes its cut of federal support
through list price increases.
the higheR educAtion Policy debAte
We highlight two major conclusions. For the four-year public
and private nonprofit institutions that still educate the bulk of
America’s college students, our enrollment management model
tells us that increases in the generosity of need-based federal
financial aid are unlikely to cause schools to raise list price
tuition. most of the evidence suggests that a significant portion
of any increased aid does get through to students as a lower net
price. But schools can siphon off some fraction of the aid, and
our second conclusion is that this “tax rate” is fairly low overall.
At state universities, there is good evidence that virtually all of the
aid reaches its target and schools do not tax it. Schools that are
the most generous with their own aid assess the highest tax rate.
The original Bennett hypothesis does
have some empirical support. With more
than a touch of irony, the “greedy colleges”
thatwould react to increases in the generos-
ity of federal financial aid by hiking tuition
tend to be found in the for-profit sector,
which is themostmarket-oriented segment
of the higher education industry.
The debate about the Bennett hypoth-
esis is part of an ideological tussle that
currently dominates public discussion of
higher education. On one side we hear
impassioned claims that the magic of unfettered and unsubsi-
dized markets can solve the college cost problem. On the other
side we have those who believe that free is the right price for
everything of social value. And from both sides we are regularly
treated tofinger-wagging about costly andwasteful amenities. But
the college cost problem has deep roots in the nature of higher
education as a personal service industry with a highly educated
workforce. Our student-centered federal financial aid system is
not a significant driver of the tuition bill at the nation’s nonprofit
colleges and universities.
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